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On one hand, intelligence testing is one of
the great successes of psychology (Hunt,
2011). Intelligence test scores predict many
real world phenomena and have many
well-validated practical uses (Gottfredson,
1997; Deary et al., 2010). Intelligence test
scores also correlate to structural and func-
tional brain parameters assessed with neu-
roimaging (Haier et al., 1988; Jung and
Haier, 2007; Deary et al., 2010; Penke et al.,
2012; Colom et al., 2013a) and to genes
(Posthuma et al., 2002; Hulshoff Pol et al.,
2006; Chiang et al., 2009, 2012; Stein et al.,
2012). On the other hand, intelligence test
scores are often misunderstood and can
be misused. This paper focuses on a basic
misunderstanding that permeates many of
the recent reports of increased intelligence
following short-term cognitive training.
Several of these reports have been pub-
lished in prominent journals and received
wide public attention (Jaeggi et al., 2008,
2011; Mackey et al., 2011).
The basic misunderstanding is assum-
ing that intelligence test scores are units of
measurement like inches or liters or grams.
They are not. Inches, liters and grams are
ratio scales where zero means zero and
100 units are twice 50 units. Intelligence
test scores estimate a construct using inter-
val scales and have meaning only rela-
tive to other people of the same age and
sex. People with high scores generally do
better on a broad range of mental abil-
ity tests, but someone with an IQ score
of 130 is not 30% smarter then some-
one with an IQ score of 100. A score of
130 puts the person in the highest 2% of
the population whereas a score of 100 is
at the 50th percentile. A change from an
IQ score from 100 to 103 is not the same
as a change from 133 to 136. This makes
simple interpretation of intelligence test
score changes impossible.
Most recent studies that have claimed
increases in intelligence after a cognitive
training intervention rely on comparing
an intelligence test score before the inter-
vention to a second score after the inter-
vention. If there is an average change
score increase for the training group that
is statistically significant (using a depen-
dent t-test or similar statistical test), this
is treated as evidence that intelligence has
increased. This reasoning is correct if one
is measuring ratio scales like inches, liters
or grams before and after some inter-
vention (assuming suitable and reliable
instruments like rulers to avoid erroneous
Cold Fusion-like conclusions that appar-
ently were based on faulty heat measure-
ment); it is not correct for intelligence test
scores on interval scales that only estimate
a relative rank order rather than measure
the construct of intelligence. Even though
the estimate has considerable predictive
value and correlates to brain and genetic
measures, it is not a measurement in the
same way we measure distance, liquid, or
weight even if individual change scores are
used in a pre-post design.
SAT scores, for example, are highly cor-
related to intelligence test scores (Frey and
Detterman, 2004). Imagine a student takes
the SATs when quite ill. The scores likely
are a bad estimate of the student’s abil-
ity. If the student retakes the test some-
time later when well, does an increase in
score mean the student’s intelligence has
increased, or that the newer score is now
just a better estimate? The same is true
for score changes following SAT prepara-
tory courses. Many colleges and univer-
sities allow applicants to submit multiple
SAT scores and the highest score typically
carries the most weight; there are many
spurious reasons for low scores but far
fewer for high scores. Change scores from
lowest to highest carry little if any weight.
By contrast, change in a person’s weight
after some intervention is unambiguous.
In studies of the effect of cognitive
training on intelligence, it is also impor-
tant to understand that all intelligence test
scores include a certain amount of impre-
cision or error. This is called the standard
error of measurement and can be quanti-
fied as an estimate of a “true” score based
on observed scores. The standard error of
measuring inches or liters is usually zero
assuming you have perfectly reliable, stan-
dard measurement devices. Intelligence
tests generally show high test-retest relia-
bility but they also have a standard error,
and the standard error is often larger for
higher scores than for lower scores. Any
intelligence test score change after an inter-
vention needs to be considered relative
to the standard error of the test. Studies
that use a single test to estimate intelli-
gence before and after an intervention are
using less reliable and more variable scores
(bigger standard errors) than studies that
combine scores from a battery of tests.
Change scores are never easy to inter-
pret and require sophisticated statistical
methods and research designs with appro-
priate control groups. If you try a training
intervention in individuals all of whom
have pre-intervention scores below the
population mean, for example, re-testing
with or without any intervention, may
result in higher scores due to the sta-
tistical phenomenon of regression to the
mean, or due to simple test practice, espe-
cially if equivalent alternative forms of
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the test are not used. Quasi-experimental
designs like post-test only with large sam-
ples and random assignment do not have
all the same interpretation difficulties as
pre-post designs. They have promise but
most reviewers are more inclined to value
pre-post changes. Latent variable tech-
niques also avoid many of the difficulties
of pre-post interval scale changes and they
have promise in large samples (Ferrer and
McArdle, 2010).
When change scores are used, it is
important to identify individual differ-
ences even within a group where the aver-
age change score statistically increases after
an intervention. Imagine a group of 100
students received cognitive training and
100 others received some control inter-
vention. The mean change score in the
training group may statistically show a
greater increase than the controls. How
many of the 100 individuals who received
the training actually show an increase? Do
they differ in any way from the individu-
als in the same group who do not show an
increase? Does item analysis show whether
increased scores are due more to easy test
items or hard ones? What about any indi-
viduals in the control group that show
change score increases as large as shown
in the training group? If all 200 partici-
pants ultimately get the same training, will
the rank order of individuals based on the
post-training score be any different than
the rank order based on the pre-training
scores? If not, what has been accom-
plished? Most studies do not report such
analyses, although newer training studies
are addressing issues of multiple measure
assessment of intelligence and individual
differences (Colom et al., 2013b; Jaeggi
et al., 2013). Burgaleta et al provide a good
example of showing IQ changes subject-
by-subject (Burgaleta et al., 2014).
Nonetheless, the main point is that
to make the most compelling argument
that intelligence increases after an inter-
vention, a ratio scale of intelligence is
required. None yet exists and meaning-
ful progress may require a new way of
defining intelligence based onmeasureable
brain or information processing variables.
For example, gray and white matter den-
sity in specific brain regions assessed by
imaging and expressed as a profile of stan-
dard scores based on a normative group
might substitute for intelligence test scores
(Haier, 2009). Work by Engle and col-
leagues suggests that working memory
capacity and perceptual speed are possible
ways to assess fluid intelligence (Broadway
and Engle, 2010; Redick et al., 2012)
based on a large body of research that
shows faster mental processing speed and
increased memory capacity are related to
higher intelligence.
Jensen has written extensively about
an evolution from psychometrics to men-
tal “chronometrics”—the use of response
time in milliseconds to measure infor-
mation processing in a standard way
(Jensen, 2006). He argued that the con-
struct of intelligence could be replaced
in favor of ratio scale measures of speed
of information processing assessed dur-
ing standardized cognitive tasks like the
Hick paradigm. Such measures, for exam-
ple, would help advance research about
the underlying neurophysiology of mental
speed and might lead to a more advanced
definition of intelligence. Jensen con-
cluded his book on chronometry with this
call to action: “. . . chronometry provides
the behavioral and brain sciences with
a universal absolute scale for obtaining
highly sensitive and frequently repeatable
measurements of an individual’s perfor-
mance on specially devised cognitive tasks.
Its time has come. Let’s get to work!”
(p. 246).
This is a formidable challenge and a
major priority for intelligence researchers.
Collaboration among psychometricians
and cognitive psychologists will be key.
There are now a number of studies that fail
to replicate the claims of increased intel-
ligence after short-term memory training
and various reasons are proposed (Colom
et al., 2013b; Harrison et al., 2013). Given
our narrow focus here, we note one failure
to replicate also assessed working memory
capacity and perceptual speed; no trans-
fer effects were found (Redick et al., 2013)
and there is reason to suggest that other
positive transfer studies may be erroneous
(Tidwell et al., 2013). For now, cognitive
training results are more inconsistent than
not, especially for putative intelligence
increases. Nonetheless, it is encouraging
that cognitive researchers are working on
these issues despite a pervasive indiffer-
ence or negativity to intelligence research
in Psychology in general and for many
funding agencies.
In the broader context, intelligence
includes more than one component.
However, the construct of interest usu-
ally is defined by psychometric methods
as a general factor common to all mental
abilities called the g-factor (Jensen, 1998).
Fluid intelligence, the focus of several cog-
nitive training studies, is one of several
broad intelligence factors and it is highly
correlated to g. The g-factor is estimated
by intelligence tests but it is not synony-
mous with IQ or any other test score;
some tests are more g-loaded than others.
As noted, a score on an intelligence test has
little meaning without comparing it to the
scores of other people. That is why all intel-
ligence tests require normative groups for
comparison and why norm groups need to
be updated periodically, as demonstrated
by the Flynn Effect of gradual genera-
tional increases in intelligence test scores;
although whether g shows the Flynn effect
is still unsettled (te Nijenhuis and van
der Flier, 2013). Psychometric estimations
of g and other intelligence factors have
generated strong empirical findings about
the nature of intelligence and individual
differences, mostly based on correlation
studies. These interval assessments, how-
ever, are not sufficient to take research to
the next step of experimental interventions
to increase intelligence.
Speaking about science, Carl Sagan
observed that extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence. So far, we do not
have it for claims about increasing intelli-
gence after cognitive training or, for that
matter, any other manipulation or treat-
ment, including early childhood educa-
tion. Small statistically significant changes
in test scores may be important observa-
tions about attention or memory or some
other elemental cognitive variable or a spe-
cific mental ability assessed with a ratio
scale like milliseconds, but they are not
sufficient proof that general intelligence
has changed. As in all branches of science,
progress depends on ever more sophis-
ticated measurement that drives more
precise definitions—think about the evo-
lution of definition for a “gene” or an
“atom”. Even with sophisticated interval-
based assessment techniques (Ferrer and
McArdle, 2010), until we have better mea-
sures, especially ratio scales, we need to
acknowledge the basic measurement prob-
lem and exercise abundant restraint when
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reporting putative intelligence increases or
decreases.
In the future, there may be strong
empirical rationales for spending large
sums of money on cognitive training or
other interventions aimed at improving
specific mental abilities or school achieve-
ment (in addition to the compelling
moral arguments to do so), but increas-
ing general intelligence is quite difficult to
demonstrate with current tests. Increasing
intelligence, however, is a worthy goal that
might be achieved by interventions based
on sophisticated neuroscience advances in
DNA analysis, neuroimaging, psychophar-
macology, and even direct brain stim-
ulation (Haier, 2009, 2013; Lozano and
Lipsman, 2013; Santarnecchi et al., 2013;
Legon et al., 2014). Developing equally
sophisticated ratio measurement of intel-
ligence must go hand-in-hand with devel-
oping promising interventions.
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